Principles of Competence: The Ability of
Public Institutions to Adopt Remedial
Affirmative Action Plans
Public institutions frequently adopt affirmative action plans
that grant preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of
their membership in a minority group. Many of these plans are
designed to remedy earlier violations of the antidiscrimination
laws. Despite this benign purpose, individuals not eligible for preference may challenge the plans as explicit racial classifications prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Such cases contain a vexing
irony: government action aimed at remedying illegal discrimination
is itself alleged to be discriminatory and illegal.
Under the Supreme Court's current approach to equal protection issues, the government's ability to adopt race-conscious plans
depends on a showing of "compelling" government interest.' Such
plans may serve a variety of "nonremedial" interests, such as fostering diversity or promoting greater operational effectiveness
through integration. 2 Often, however, the remedying of past discrimination is the central or even the sole interest claimed to be

I A majority of the Supreme Court now seems to review race-conscious affirmative action plans under a standard of strict scrutiny, requiring a "compelling" governmental interest before they may be adopted. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846
(1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 1852-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White, J.); see also infra note 9
(describing levels of scrutiny). In the past, however, the Justices have often differed on this
question, some requiring that the interest be "compelling," see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting), others "important," Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). In the plurality opinion
in Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger refused to define which standard of scrutiny applied, although he indicated in that case that the government's interest was sufficient to survive
even the strictest scrutiny. 448 U.S. at 492.
2 These government interests, apart from the remedying of past discrimination, may be
sufficiently compelling to warrant the use of explicit racial classifications. For instance, in
Bakke, Justice Powell accepted the goal of diversity in education as compelling. See 438
U.S. at 311-15 (Powell, J.); see also Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 n.17 (1982) (rejecting
diversity as a compelling interest). Other interests, such as the need to integrate a police
force in order for it to function more effectively, might also be compelling. This comment,
however, focuses on race-conscious plans that serve a remedial purpose.
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served by such a plan. s If this claim is rejected by the courts, all
that remains is an unjustified classification based on race. The focus of this comment is the question thus raised: When should
courts accept a public institution's claim that a race-conscious plan
serves the government's interest in remedying past discrimination?
Courts facing remedial affirmative action plans have diverged
widely in their analyses. For example, two separate panels of the
Ninth Circuit have reached opposite results in evaluating the ability of a school board to adopt remedial affirmative action measures
in the granting of contracts.4 Part I of this comment reviews several different approaches emerging from the Supreme Court's decisions on affirmative action, and then traces the resulting disagreement and confusion among the lower courts.
Part II then argues that a unifying principle for evaluating
government claims that race-conscious programs are aimed at remedying past discrimination can be found in the idea of institutional
competence. Using the example of congressional action, this part
identifies two distinct aspects of competence: the authority of the
institution to adopt an affirmative action plan, and the findings of
fact made by the institution which indicate past violations of the
antidiscrimination laws. When both aspects of competence are
present, it is likely that the institutional decision to adopt a raceconscious plan furthers a sufficiently compelling purpose and was
not motivated by an impermissible desire to benefit one group
more than another solely on the basis of race.
Part III applies this concept of competence to various public
institutions. It concludes that, like Congress, state legislatures have
a broad capacity to adopt remedial affirmative action plans; local
representative bodies are competent in a similar but somewhat
narrower range of circumstances. Administrative agencies may also
possess such power, depending on the institution's particular characteristics. Once the necessary authorization is shown and appropriate findings have been made, a court should hold that the government has demonstrated a compelling interest, and need only
review the plan to determine whether or not it actually serves that
3 The Supreme Court has rejected the remedying of unspecified "societal discrimination" as a sufficiently compelling governmental interesi for adopting an affirmative action
plan. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48 (plurality opinon); id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1857 (White, J., concurring); see also infra note 103.
4 Compare Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir.) (rejecting school board affirmative action contract grant plan), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1061 (1980), with Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.
1981) (approving similar plan), vacated, 457 U.S. 594 (1982).
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interest. 5

I.

THE PROBLEM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall
deny any person the equal protection of the laws.' In scrutinizing
government acts that classify and distinguish among individuals,
the courts have interpreted the equal protection clause as a requirement that "similar individuals. . . be dealt with in a similar
manner by the government. ' ' 7 Impermissible treatment contrary to
this command is most likely to occur when the government activity
is motivated by an improper government purpose, such as
prejudice." Consequently, the courts have subjected government
actions to more searching inquiry when the likelihood is greater
that the acts were impermissibly motivated.9
5 The question of how closely the plan adopted meets its objectives is classically called
the "means-end fit." In the language of the Supreme Court, the plan must be "narrowly
tailored" to its alleged objectives. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846-47, 1849-50 (plurality
opinion); id. at 1853, 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480 (plurality
opinion); see also infra note 9 (describing levels of scrutiny). How narrowly tailored the plan
must be is discussed briefly infra note 174. Yet this comment primarily addresses the logically distinct and antecedent question of when a public institution establishes a government
interest sufficient to justify the adoption of a race-conscious remedial plan.
' US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 J. NowAu, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSrrUrrIoNAL LAW 586 (2d ed. 1983).
I Id. (motive analysis "does not reject the government's ability to classify persons...
but it does guarantee that those classifications will not be based upon impermissible criteria
or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals").
' Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), courts have stringently examined classifications directed at "discrete
and insular minorities." Such legislative classifications deserve heightened scrutiny because
the political process is more likely to have been motivated by impermissible purposes, such
as prejudice, when classifications are directed at insular groups. Thus, a court will not uphold such acts unless they serve a "compelling interest" of the government and unless the
means chosen are "narrowly tailored" to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Because very few statutes subjected
to strict scrutiny have been upheld, such intense review has been called "'strict' in theory,
and fatal in fact." See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
In contrast, classifications that have no special impact on politically powerless minority
groups or on the exercise of a fundamental right need only be reasonable to survive judicial
review. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-88 (1955). Under this rationality review, the classification need only be a reasonable means of attaining a legitimate
government interest.
Finally, intermediate scrutiny is used in the middle cases where a classification is directed at an insular group but where there are certain reasons that may justify some differentiation. Under this level of scrutiny a classification must be based on an "important"
governmental interest and be "substantially related" to its goal. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex).
It should be noted that the analysis in this comment does not depend on what level of
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Affirmative action plans, which inherently involve explicit racial classifications, pose some danger of impermissible motivation.
Yet affirmative action plans often have a remedial aim which, in
contrast to bare prejudice,'could constitute a valid government interest for instituting the plan. The Supreme Court has found that
the government's interest in remedying the effects of a violation of
the antidiscrimination laws is "compelling." 10 But since the government may assert a past violation to conceal actual motives that
are impermissible, the courts need some way to distinguish true
assertions from false ones. Thus the crucial step in validating a
race-conscious plan is establishing a proper foundation for concluding that the plan has a remedial component."' But in the absence of a judicial determination that the antidiscrimination laws
have been violated, 2 it is unclear when other government bodies
may adopt affirmative action plans and whether their own findings
of illegal discrimination can serve as the basis for such plans.
Current court doctrine provides little aid in resolving this issue. The Supreme Court's decisions have produced no less than
five distinct positions. Faced with this uncertainty, the lower
courts have struggled on the way to further disagreement and conscrutiny the courts apply in examining remedial affirnative action plans. If an institution is
judged "competent" to institute such plans, it makes out a sufficiently compelling government interest for its action. A fortiori, the adoption of such plans by a competent institution
meets the "government interest" prong of any lower level of scrutiny as well. For a brief

discussion of the appropriate standard of scrutiny for cases involving remedial affirmative
action plans, see infra note 174.
10 See Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (district court
may use racial statistics to formulate a remedial plan); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968) (school boards have an affirmative duty to eliminate discrimination "root and
branch"). In addition, the Court's busing cases confirm that remedial needs justify burdening innocent parties. See Columbus Rd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Ed.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).

For the purposes of this comment, the "antidiscrimination laws" include all constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination; hence, both the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the civil rights statutes, for example, fall into this
category.
21 When a government body justifies its adoption of an affirmative action plan with
reference to nonremedial interests, such as the fostering of diversity, the Court's approach

will be analytically simpler than it is for a remedial plan. Since, by hypothesis, the plan is
nonremedial, findings of prior discrimination become irrelevant. The sole issue is whether
the nonremedial interest put forward to justify the plan is found to be sufficiently important
or compelling to justify the racial classification. Beyond that issue, judicial review is limited

to determining whether the plan adopted in fact properly advances the interests identified.
12 The law is clear that a judicialfinding of past illegal discrimination provides a compelling government interest in eliminating that discrimination and its effects. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Such a finding therefore justifies
the use of explicit racial classifications to achieve that remedial objective.
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fusion. This part presents the major opposing views in order to set
the stage for further discussion.
A.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

In University of California Regents v. Bakke,13 a deeply divided court determined that a racial classification adopted by the
California Board of Regents, which established a separate minority
track for admission to medical school, violated the fourteenth
amendment. 14 Conversely, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,15 the Court divided in upholding an affirmative action program enacted by Congress for minority business enterprises. 6 Most recently, in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education,1 7 the Court again divided in striking down a race-conscious layoff plan adopted by a school board as
part of its collective bargaining agreement with the teachers'
union.1 8 The opinions in these cases offer five separate approaches
to the question of when a government institution may adopt affirmative action in the absence of a judicial finding of illegal past
discrimination.
1. Polar Positions. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Bakke and Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove set out two polar
Is 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
1 The affirmative action plan at the University of California at Davis Medical School
consisted of a two-track admissions program. Sixteen of the 100 positions available were
reserved for minority applicants. Those applicants did not have to compete with the applicants in the general admissions program. Id. at 275. Justice Powell wrote for the Court.
Justice Brennan's concurrence spoke for four members of the Court. The three other Justices joined Justice Stevens' dissent, which did not reach the constitutional question. Id. at
408.

i' 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

The minority business enterprise provisions of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982)), amending Local
Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90
Stat. 999, required at least 10% of federal funds granted for local public works projects to
be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned
by minority group members, absent an administrative waiver. Minority-group members included United States citizens who were "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." 42 U.S.C. § 705(f)(2). In Fullilove, Justice Burger wrote a plurality opinion, in which Justices White and Powell joined. Justice Powell and Justice Marshall each
concurred separately, with Justices Brennan and Blackmun joining Justice Marshall. Justice
Stevens and Justice Stewart wrote in dissent.
17 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
18 The collective bargaining agreement provided that layoffs of teachers would be made
according to seniority, except that "at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time
of the layoff." Id. at 1845 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell wrote for the plurality, which
included Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justices White and O'Connor concurred, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens wrote in dissent.
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visions of government competence. While Justice Brennan would
allow most government institutions to enact affirmative action
plans, Justice Stewart's view allows only impartial and deliberative
bodies-such as courts-to adopt explicit racial classifications.
In Bakke, Justice Brennan articulated a broad conception of
government competence. He argued first that a judicial finding of
racial discrimination was not a necessary predicate to an affirmative action plan because requiring such a finding would frustrate
voluntary compliance with the antidiscrimination laws.1 9 He also
stated that proof that benefited individuals had been actual victims of past discrimination was not required in the case of "historically disadvantaged minorities" who are within a "general class of
persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination."2 0 The
requisite harm to individual minority group members could be inferred from the broader historical context of discrimination in
America. Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, a finding of past discrimination against a disadvantaged minority by a government institution was not crucial to the institution's ability to adopt an affirmative action plan. 1
Drawing on several cases that emphasized similar concerns
when congressional action was involved,2 2 Justice Brennan then
concluded that specific findings were unnecessary for the adoption
of affirmative action plans by the states. But he did not limit this
conclusion to state legislatures, which are the clear analogues to
Congress. Instead, he noted that generally a state could delegate
functions within its governing structure however it chose. 23 Thus,
in Bakke he determined that the California Constitution's grant to
the Regents of plenary legislative and administrative power over
the state university system constituted sufficient authorization to
permit them to adopt a race-conscious admissions program without
a prior finding of a discriminatory violation.2 4
19 438 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by White, Marshall & Blackmun,
JJ.). Justice O'Connor holds a similar view. See infra note 53.
20

Id. at 363.

21 Id. at 366 & n.42.

11 Id. at 366; see, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) (plurality
opinion); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); cf. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317
(1977) (citing the "important governmental objective' of reducing "the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination" to
justify preferential benefits system).
2 438 U.S. at 366 n.42; cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (whether persons in the executive, legislative or judicial branch may
exercise the powers of another department is for the determination of the state).
24 438 U.S. at 366-67 & n.42.
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Under Justice Brennan's test in Bakke, a government institution may adopt a remedial affirmative action plan as long as it has
been given broad discretionary power to administer a government
activity. In his view, this general power to administer some activity
implicitly includes the full power to adopt affirmative action plans.
No specific findings of past discrimination are necessary when
"there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product of
'25
past racial discrimination.
The other end of the spectrum emerges with Justice Stewart's
dissent in Fullilove: explicit racial classifications may be imposed
only by a court. 26 He conceded that a violation of the antidiscrimination laws creates a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify the use of explicit racial classifications. 7 Yet he
suggested that only an impartial, deliberative body could find violations of law and craft a remedy that distributed benefits to those
identified as victims of the violation.28 The courts meet this criterion of deliberative impartiality. Legislatures, in contrast, have
"neither the dispassionate objectivity nor the flexibility that are
needed to mold a race-conscious remedy around the single objec'29
tive of eliminating the effects of past or present discrimination.
Although Justice Stewart acknowledged Congress's explicit authority to enact legislation enforcing the fourteenth amendment,3 0
he argued that such authority is limited to enactments which
would remedy specific injuries. In his view, Congress's ability to
legislate enforcement of the fourteenth amendment gives it no
greater power than the judiciary to make racial classifications.
Therefore, because Congress lacks the adjudicatory capabilities
necessary to find violations of the law and adopt remedial programs, remedial affirmative action plans may remain beyond even
Congress.
2. Middle Ground. Between these two positions lie the
closely related views of Justices Stevens, Powell, and O'Connor.
Each Justice considers both the authority of a public institution
2" Id. at 366. Justice Brennan, along with Justices Marshall and Blackmun, has continued to rely on this formulation of the proper standard for evaluating affirmative action
plans. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1861-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 525 n.4.
28 Id. at 527.
" Id. Justice Stewart went on to argue, however, that the plan was invalid "even assuming" Congress had the authority to implement it because it did not have the "sole purpose" of remedying past discrimination. Id. at 527-28.
:0 Id., at 526; see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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and its ability to make findings of past discrimination important in
determining the institution's competence to impose remedial plans.
Each agrees that institutions other than courts may adopt such
plans. They differ principally in the nature of the findings they
require of governmental bodies.
Justice Stevens argues that government institutions of all sorts
may be able to adopt remedial plans. In order to do so, however,
the authorizing provision must be unmistakably clear. Such clarity
might arise if the adoption of a remedial plan is "expressly mandated by Congress or the President," or if the "agency which
promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting" the government's interest in remedying illegal discrimination.sl In his Fullilove dissent, Justice Stevens acknowledged that
Congress has the power to enact race-based remedial measures.3 2
But he did not discuss whether this power may be exercised by
other government organs absent express authorization.
Moreover, in Justice Stevens' view, even authorized institutions must show that they carefully considered their decision to
adopt a race-conscious plan. For "just as procedural safeguards are
necessary to guarantee the impartial decisionmaking in the judicial
process, so can they play a vital part in preserving the impartial
character of the legislative process."3 3 Applying this analysis in
31 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (emphasis added). In Hamp-

ton, Justice Stevens struck down a Civil Service Commission employment rule that classified persons upon the basis of alienage. One of the grounds for decision was a concern that
one of the government interests behind such a rule, to effectuate foreign policy objectives,
was not within the Commission's authorization. Id. at 114-17. The analysis in Hampton is
somewhat inapposite since it was not an equal protection case, strictly speaking, and its
reasoning pertained to the adoption of a rule which disadvantaged minority groups. Since
Justice Stevens considers any racial classification to be suspect, however, see Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting), his position in Hampton relates directly to his analysis of affirmative action plans. Justice Powell, too, stressed the importance of Hampton by
citing it repeatedly in his Bakke opinion. See 438 U.S. at 302 n.41, 309.
32See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 548-49 & n.23 (acknowledging congressional power to enact "statutory classification[s] based on race"); cf. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 114 (assuming that
Congress and the President have equal authority to create alien classifications).
"3 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 549; accord id. at 552 (Congress failed to "follow procedures
that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental constitutional issue of this kind
obviously merits"); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 255 (1976);
Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HAIIv. L. REv. 1373, 1414 (1978) (Hampton "posits a right to procedural
due process which requires that some legislative actions be undertaken only by a governmental entity which is so structured and so charged as to make possible a reflective determination that the action contemplated is fair, reasonable, and not at odds with specific
prohibitions in the Constitution"). This analysis has been labelled "structural due process."
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AmcRIcA CONSTrrUTiONAL LAW §§ 17-1 to -3 (1978); Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HAuRv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 299-303 (1975).
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Fullilove, he voted to strike down the minority set-aside program
because the record was inadequate to prove that Congress deliberated about the need for such a program. Unlike Justice Stewart,
however, he did not despair of institutional compliance with a
stringent findings requirement.3 4 He would uphold the adoption of
a carefully tailored racial preference whenever the institution can
show, by creating a sufficiently detailed, court-like record, that it
has found a prior violation of the antidiscrimination laws.3 5
Justice Stevens continued to adhere to this view in Wygant.
After scrupulously examining the procedures by which the school
board had decided to adopt and implement a race-concious plan,36
he concluded that there was not a "shred of evidence [to] suggest[]
3' 7
any procedural unfairness in the adoption of the agreement.
Thus, because he concluded that the government's policy of seeking a diverse faculty was sufficiently compelling,3 8 and because the
plan was adopted only after careful consideration and the full participation of all those affected by it, Justice Stevens voted to uphold the challenged layoff plan.
Thus, for Justice Stevens, an institution's ability to adopt a
remedial affirmative action plan is limited by the concepts of due
process that he finds inherent in equal protection. A party is entitled to certain procedural safeguards before being burdened by
state action. Equal protection requires that proper procedures be
observed and that institutions enacting race-conscious measures
make deliberative decisions before harming those excluded by the
preference. 9
Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke and Fullilove set out a twoprong competence test similar to that of Justice Stevens. As he
stated the test:
First, the governmental body that attempts to impose a raceconscious remedy must have the authority to act in response
to identified discrimination. Second, the governmental body
must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal
40
discrimination.
In Fullilove, Congress clearly had the necessary authority to

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 550-51 n.28.
Id. at 538-39, 550-52.
3 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1869-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 1870 (emphasis in original).
3

" Id. at 1868.
"
40

Fultilove, 448 U.S. at 550-52; see also supra note 33 (citing other authorities).
448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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adopt the minority set-aside program. Two explicit constitutional
grants empowered it to enact race-conscious measures: the commerce clause and the enforcement provision of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 Moreover, he reasoned, a legislative body has broad
power to make policy for the people it represents.4 2
In contrast, the Regents' "mission" in Bakke was restricted to
educational matters.4" Justice Powell argued that the university
was not authorized to remedy past discrimination other than its
own because such broad measures were not within its delegated
power. The limitation on the Regents' authority was required because "isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are
not competent to make [affirmative action] decisions, at least in
the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined
44
criteria.
Justice Powell also required that even properly authorized institutions make findings of past statutory or constitutional violations before adopting a remedial plan. The body implementing the
plan must have evidence that impermissible discrimination actually existed. Thus, he emphasized in Bakke that the Regents did
"not purport to have made, and [were] in no position to make,
'45
such findings.
Although Justice Powell's language in Bakke sounds very similar to that of Justice Stevens, in Fullilove Powell made clear his
41 The plurality in Fullilove was also concerned with whether the minority set-asides
were within the congressional spending power. Chief Justice Burger reasoned, though, that

"[t]he reach of the Spending Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory
powers of Congress." Id. at 475 (plurality opinion). The Court thereafter focused its analysis

on the commerce clause and the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment.
42 Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
43 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (Powell, J.).

" Id. The Regents are a public corporation with responsibility for administering the
affairs of the University of California system. They are "isolated" or lack accountability
since they are not elected-vacancies are filled by the Governor. See O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thought, 67 CALiF. L. Rav. 143, 152 (1979). However, as Justice
Brennan noted, several California court decisions have treated the Regents as empowered
by the state constitution with full legislative authority. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366-67 n.42
(Brennan, J., concurring).
4" 438 U.S. at 309 (Powell, J.). On this basis, Justice Powell distinguished Bakke from
earlier cases where the actions of the authorized institutions were predicated on "judicial,

legislative or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307. In
indicating approval of those earlier cases, see id. at 300-04, Justice Powell showed that he

did not believe Congress alone was competent to adopt remedial plans. The cases he cited
included United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plan adopted by a state legislature), Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.) (plan adopted by an
administrative agency), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315

(8th Cir. 1972) (plan adopted by a court), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (plan adopted by a school board).
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disagreement with Justice Stevens' "due process of lawmaking"
approach. Instead, he adopted a more traditional equal protection
approach, which sought to ensure that the race-conscious plan was
not premised on an impermissible motive.4' The requirement of
deliberation and findings, he suggested, is a useful tool for screening out improper purpose. Yet this tool becomes less crucial when
there are other guarantees that impermissible motives are absent.
In deciding that Congress's findings need not be exhaustive or
set out in a court-like record, Justice Powell relied on such a guarantee: the legislative nature of Congress. He emphasized that Congress's "constitutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to make policy rather than to apply settled principles of
law."'4 7 Congress has "special attribute[s] as a legislative body"-it
can receive information from many different sources, and it can
aggregate the experience it has acquired in addressing the problem
of discrimination in different statutes over the course of many
years.48 Thus, while he required that nonlegislative bodies such as
the Regents make particularized findings, Justice Powell significantly relaxed the stringency of this requirement for Congress. He
concluded that committee reports concerning earlier related legislation were sufficient to meet the standard.4 9
In his plurality opinion in Wygant, Justice Powell continued
to emphasize the need for government institutions to make particularized findings before adopting an affirmative action plan. In the
absence of such findings, he reasoned, "a court could uphold reme46 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
47 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502; see also O'Neil, supra note 44, at 152 (interpreting Justice
Powell's view to be that a "legislative body can be trusted more fully than can the Regents
to take into account the competing claims of all groups seeking a preference. Accountability
to the electorate is more readily assured").
48

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03. Justice Powell rejected Justice Stevens' suggestion, see

id. at 553-54, that the Court must limit its scrutiny of congressional findings to those made

in the legislative history of the bill at issue. Such an approach would ignore Congress's special ability to look beyond the facts brought before it by particular parties. Powell argued
that the Court must not narrow Congress's broad investigatory powers if Congress is to

carry out its obligation of fashioning "national rules for the governance of. . . society." Id.
at 502. Moreover, Congress often develops an expertise from previously considering an issue;
it may have much greater knowledge than the legislative history indicates. Id. at 502-03.
Thus, Justice Powell emphasized the fact that several years earlier Congress had given detailed consideration to minority preference provisions in similar legislation. Id. at 504-05.
4'

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-06 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger also

credited Congress with knowledge of past committee reports that had made findings of discrimination. Id. at 478 (plurality opinion). Although Powell and Burger's view apparently

was the majority view, Fullilove might be interpreted, less plausibly, as requiring no congressional findings at all. The implications of such an approach are criticized infra at notes
94, 118-19 and accompanying text.
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dies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in
their ability to affect the future." 50 The school board had not only
failed to make any determination that its layoff program was remedial, it had consistently denied that it had ever engaged in any
discriminatory practices. 5 1 In Justice Powell's view, the absence of
any findings of past discrimination provided a sufficient ground to
2
invalidate the plan.5
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant also reflected some
attention to the issues of authority and findings. She argued that a
competent government actor is not required to make findings of
past discrimination before it adopts an affirmative action plan.5 3
Instead, she noted that contemporaneous findings serve only as a
means of ensuring that the governmental actor is attempting to
remedy its own past conduct and not generalized societal discrimination. When the public employer makes such findings voluntarily,
they "obviously are desirable. '54 Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, however, a remedial plan may be upheld even without particularized findings, as "long as the public actor has a firm basis for
believing that remedial action is required."5
B.

Lower Court Decisions

This jumble of approaches offered by the Supreme Court has
led to confusion in the efforts of state courts and lower federal
courts to assess the validity of remedial plans. One of the lower
courts' major problems stems from the difficulty they have in distinguishing between remedial and nonremedial plans, which has
left their analysis of both kinds of plans hopelessly intertwined.5
50 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848.

Id. at 1849, 1852 n.13.
Id. at 1848-49. Justice Powell then went on to conclude that even if the compelling
purpose of remedying past discrimination was demonstrated, layoffs would be an inappropriate means of effectuating that purpose; in the layoff context the burden borne by innocents is highly individualized and not spread among society. Id. at 1849-52.
53 Wygant, 54 U.S.L.W. at 1854-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the power of
"the School Board, a court, or another competent body" to impose explicit racial classifications); see also id. at 1857 (plan was not constitutionally infirm simply because no particularized findings were made). The primary reason she gave for this conclusion was that a
contemporaneous findings requirement would "severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations." Id. at 1855 (citing Justice Brennan's
opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364).
" Id. at 1855.
51 Id. at 1853.
5, For a short explanation of why this state of affairs is problematic, see supra note 11
and accompanying text.
The lower courts have also struggled in the wake of the Supreme Court's confusion
'1

52
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In addition, the courts have differed widely in their approaches to
determining when government bodies can adopt remedial plans.
The courts universally agree that the President 7 and the Congress 58 have the authority to adopt carefully-tailored race-conscious remedial plans. Yet this is the last point of uniformity. One
district court has determined that only Congress can enact or grant
other government institutions the power to enact a remedial plan,

about the appropriate level of scrutiny that should be applied to affirmative action plans.
Some courts have adopted the intermediate-scrutiny standard suggested by Justice Brennan
in his Bakke opinion. See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 886 n.29 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322,
1338 (5th Cir. 1980); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); cf. Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir.)
(employing a "searching examination" to determine validity of an affirmative action plan),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981). Several other courts have adhered to Justice Powell's
stricter standard of scrutiny, requiring a plan to be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J.); see, e.g., Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1561 (5th Cir. 1984); Local 35, IBEW v. City of Hartford, 625
F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522
F. Supp. 338, 348 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So. 2d
893, 900 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
While a majority of courts have adopted one of these two approaches, several have
adopted the mixed-factor standard of review crafted by Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove.
This doctrine refuses to adopt any specific level of scrutiny and emphasizes a cluster of
"factors" including the importance and validity of the remedial aim, the competence of the
agency, and whether the remedy limits the burden suffered by innocent third parties. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453; see, e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 904 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); South Fla. Chapter of the Ass'd Gen. Contractors of Am.
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 851-52 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220
(1984).
Finally, several courts confronted with the issue have confessed their confusion and
simply refused to decide what level of scrutiny to apply. See Schmidt v. Oakland Unified
School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 560 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 594
(1982); Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 480, 491, 599 P.2d 1255, 1262 (1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). For a brief discussion of how this comment's analysis bears on
what level of scrutiny to apply, see infra note 174.
'7 See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
The President has acted primarily through Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (196465 compilation), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086,
3 C.F.R. 230 (1978 compilation), which requires federal contractors to take "specific steps to
guarantee equal employment opportunity [for] members of minority groups." 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.40(a) (1985). The executive order contains no specific presidential finding of past
illegal discrimination to justify adoption of the plan. Utilizing Justice Jackson's analysis in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring),
courts have found the executive order to be within the President's power to act pursuant to
congressional authorization. See NOPSI, 553 F.2d at 467 n.8; ContractorsAss'n, 442 F.2d at
168-71; see also Note, Executive Order 11,246 and Reverse Discrimination Challenges:
PresidentialAuthority to Require Affirmative Action, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 376 (1979).
58 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490-92.
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reasoning that Congress was uniquely authorized to address racial
questions through its broad powers to regulate commerce and to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. 9 However, three federal appellate courts have rejected this interpretation, holding that Congress's unique power does not exclude state legislatures from authorizing such plans."0 Indeed, one of those courts went much
further by interpreting the equal protection clause to require state
legislatures to adopt remedial plans."' Most other courts have been
content to rely on the representativeness of state legislatures for
implicit authorization. They emphasize the obvious parallel between the electoral accountability of state and federal
2
legislatures.
This emphasis on representation has been expanded by courts
that have approved plans adopted by other representative bodies,
such as county legislatures and city councils. Some courts have
stressed that any electorally accountable institution is a "competent and responsible legislative body subject to political restraints.""3 Other courts have ruled that local legislative bodies are

89 See Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629, 636-38 (M.D. Ala.
1980); see also Choper, The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 Ky. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1981-82). This view finds support in Justice Powell's
reference to Congress' "unique constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." Fullilove,448 U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 483 (plurality opinion) ("It is fundamental that in no
organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial
power than in Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.").
GoSee e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 906 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 782 (1985); South Fla. Chapter of the Ass'd Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 852 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 220 (1984); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Though Justice Powell, in Fullilove referred to the power of Congress as 'unique,' we believe he meant the power was 'notable' or 'unequalled,' not 'sole' or 'exclusive.' "); cf. Southwest Wash. Chapter of the Nat'l
Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 122, 667 P.2d 1092, 1099 (1983)
(en banc) (analogizing state police power to federal commerce power). Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion indicates that he did not believe congressional authority was exclusive. See
supra note 45.
" See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983). Numerous
courts have taken note of the implausibility of this logical inference. See, e.g., Associated
Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980); M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F.2d 338, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1981)
("The tendency to turn the language of laws that require racial neutrality-thou-shalt-notdiscriminate laws-into authority for granting racial preference is twisting the plain meaning of statutes too far.").
62 See, e.g., Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.
Mich. 1983) (characterizing the state legislature as the "ultimate policy making body" accountable to the public).
" Local 35, IBEW v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omit-
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authorized to act within the general concept of the police power,
since the adoption of remedial affirmative action plans may improve the health and safety of the community by improving race
relations. 6 ' This justification is similar to the view that local remedial plans are authorized by county Home Rule Charters. e8 Yet
other courts have flatly refused to allow local public institutions to
adopt remedial plans, arguing from Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke that these institutions are "isolated segments" of
government."6
Although the lower courts have often discussed the authority
by which elective public institutions act in adopting remedial
plans, they have seldom considered the role of specific findings of
past discrimination as a determinant of the reliability of the asserted remedial interest.6 7 This approach may reflect a plausible
interpretation of Fullilove as having imposed no findings requirement on Congress. 8 But this reading of Fullilove has not been expressly relied upon, and it is unclear whether the courts' various
approaches may instead be the inevitable consequence of the Supreme Court's own confused precedents.
The range of opinion expands when the race-conscious plan

ted), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
" See, e.g., Hutchinson Human Relations Comm'n v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 213
Kan. 308, 311-12, 517 P.2d 158, 162 (1973); Southwest Wash. Chapter of the Nat'l Elec.
Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 123, 667 P.2d 1092, 1099 (1983) (en
banc).
""See South Fla. Chapter of the Ass'd Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984). Provisions of a charter
may, for example, permit a county to waive its low bid requirement for public contracts
when the waiver is "in the county's best interests." Id. at 852. One such interest might be to
remedy the effects of illegal past discrimination. This conception of "public interest" seems
virtually identical to a broad conception of the police power. It differs only in that a state's
police power is not statute-based while home rule powers of local governments may well be.
In seeking statutory authority for a local representative body to enact an affirmative
action plan, at least one court found federal authorization, reasoning that Executive Order
11,246, see supra note 57, gives a city council receiving federal money the power to adopt a
plan to remedy past discrimination. See Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323, 1334-35
(W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated as moot, 572 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
" See, e.g., Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893, 901-02
(Ala. 1981) (refusing to permit a city council to adopt a remedial program), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 913 (1982).
17 Lower courts have often reduced the inquiry into competence to a simple inquiry
into authorization. Very few courts have focused on the sufficiency of the findings made by
the institution at this stage of their analysis. But see, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans,
729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (taking into account the findings made by the bodies
promulgating the plan); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 604
P.2d 1365 (1980) (same).
U See supra note 49.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:581

was adopted by an unelected state or federal agency.69 Indeed, several commentators have argued that only representative bodies
may adopt such plans because this kind of government action is at
odds with democratic conceptions of equality. 70 Most courts have
permitted such action by nonlegislative bodies, however, at least
when the delegating body has explicitly authorized the agency to
enact affirmative relief 7 1 In that situation, the independent competence of the agency is not really at issue; the question is simply
one of the scope of the authorization.7 2
The most troubling cases arise when the agency has adopted
race-conscious plans without any explicit delegation of authority to
do so. While some courts have concluded that the absence of specific authorization from a representative body is fatal,73 others

"'

The term "agency" is used here very broadly. It is meant to encompass any nonjudicial government body with a limited area of authority-in contrast to a legislative
body-including, for example, civil service commissions, police boards, and contracting au-

thorities. Most commonly, agency decisionmakers will be appointed rather than elected,
though this is not always the case.
70 See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action in Public Employment:
Judicial Deference to Certain Politically Responsible Bodies, 67 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1246
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Deference]; Note, Fullilove v. Klutznick: Do Affirmative Action Plans Require Congressional Authorization?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1315, 1330-31 (1981).
11 This formulation skirts the question posed by the commentators: Should remedial
authority ever be delegable? Most courts have concluded that it can be. See, e.g., United
States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467-68 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977) (approving
Labor Department adoption of affirmative action rules pursuant to Executive Order 11,246),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171
(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). Similarly, authorization by state institutions is often explicit. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1973) (approving agency affirmative action plan adopted pursuant to state executive order),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
7 Compare Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980)
(Department of Transportation lacks explicit authorization to adopt a plan conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on availability of grants to minority subcontractors), with
M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (Small Business Act provides
requisite authority to adopt a similar plan); compare also Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("public interest" authorization of Federal Communications Act insufficient
justification for licensing system which grants preferences to women), with id. at 1200
(Wald, J., dissenting) (diversity of viewpoint gained by increased female participation is
sufficient public interest within meaning of statute to justify plan). See also Valentine v.
Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 508 n.9 (8th Cir.) (finding in federal regulations the authority for university board of regents to enact an affirmative action plan), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124
(1981).
73 See, e.g., Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, (D.C. Cir. 1985); Associated Gen. Contractors
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1980) ("the constitutionality and wisdom as social policy of [affirmative action] are sharply debatable, [and this]
is precisely the kind of policy decision in which legislatures have the greatest advantage in
competence over local agencies such as school boards"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1981).
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have developed additional justifications for dispensing with the
need for express delegation, justifications which draw in part on
the requirement that findings of past violations must be made.
First, several courts have ruled that school boards fall into a
special category.7 4 They take Brown v. Board of Education5 to

embody a judgment that the educational mission of school boards
cannot be accomplished in the environment created by past actions
constituting illegal discrimination. Brown itself is seen as a sweeping finding of pervasive de jure discrimination that authorizes
school boards to remedy the problems by affirmative action."6 On
this rationale, courts have approved plans fixing the ratio of black
and white teachers,77 abolishing a promotional list for the position
of principal to advantage minority applicants, 78 and even using racial preferences in granting construction contracts.79
Another similar rationale adopted by some courts is that agencies always may adopt race-conscious plans to remedy their own
past discriminatory practices.8 0 This power may be less controversial when, as with school boards, the only question a government
body is permitted to address is whether it has discriminated de
jure in the recent past.8 ' The Sixth Circuit has gone further, however, by permitting agencies to adopt race-conscious plans after
having made their own findings of prior de facto discrimination.

2

74 See, e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 559 (9th Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 594 (1982); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 125758 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
76 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76 Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (school boards operating [segregated] school systems were required by Brown H to "'effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system' ").

See, e.g., Kromnick, 739 F.2d at 894.
See, e.g., Porcelli, 431 F.2d at 1254.
"' See, e.g., Schmidt, 662 F.2d at 550. But see Associated Gen. Contractors v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting an essentially identical plan as outside school board competence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1981). It is indeed
difficult to see how the contracting process implicates the board's educational mission.
8 See, e.g., Baker v. Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984).
31 See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); see also infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
'2 See Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984). The court distinguished the Police Board's actions from those taken by the
Regents in Bakke on the ground that the Police Board had made findings of its own past
discrimination, while the Regents had acted only to remedy societal discrimination. The
Police Board, the court argued, was competent to remedy its own prior acts. The Regents,
conversely, were not competent to remedy amorphous societal discrimination. Id. at 888
77

78
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Finally, several courts have hinted at formulations of a more
permissive "public body with competence to act" test. They reason
that a nonlegislative body with public visibility and an expertise in
administering a particular field is not disabled from adopting a
race-conscious plan by the absence of an explicit grant of authority
or particularized findings. These courts conclude that the visibility
and general expertise of the agency provide a sufficient restraint to
insure that the affirmative action plan is not impermissibly motivated. 83 Often this view is left implicit, and the courts simply gloss
over the issue of competence. 4 Consequently, these courts may approve agencies as competent to adopt race-conscious plans without
considering the extent of the agency's findings of past
discrimination."5

II. PRINCIPLES OF COMPETENCE
This confusion of doctrines within the Supreme Court and
among the state and lower federal courts has left affirmative action
law in disarray. Justice Powell's notion of "competence" suggests a
possible resolution of the confusion: Assuming the constitutionality
of remedial affirmative action, courts should focus on ensuring that
an institution's asserted remedial motive is legitimate. Thus, a
court's central challenge when reviewing an allegedly remedial affirmative action plan is to distinguish between true and false remedial claims. The concept of competence does this by testing the
reliability of the government's claim of a past violation of the antidiscrimination laws. If a government body's claim of a past violation is reliable, then a reviewing court can be confident that a legitimate remedial interest actually motivated the race-conscious plan.
In attempting to articulate a theory of competence, the following discussion coincides with much of Justice Powell's approach in
Bakke and Fullilove. In particular, this section looks closely at the
n.33.

See, e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); see also O'Neil, supra note 44, at 154-55. This approach is occasionally used as a supplement to the two tests just discussed.
" See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Van Aken v. Young, 541 F. Supp. 448, 456 (E.D. Mich.
1982), afl'd, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984). One commentator has gone further, arguing that
any public body is competent to adopt an affirmative action plan because remedying societal
discrimination and advancing integration are always compelling needs. See Wright, ColorBlind Theories and Color-ConsciousRemedies, 47 U. CHL L. REv. 213, 228-31 (1980).

" This is not to say that the courts ignore findings altogether, for they typically scrutinize the extent of findings when they consider the means-end fit, though not in determining
competence.
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two requirements Justice Powell seeks to impose on any government body that establishes a remedial plan: authority and findings.
These requirements are first examined separately in order to explain how each contributes to the reliability of an institution's
claim to be responding to past violations. This section then shows
how these two requirements complement one another, and concludes that bodies with greater authority or fact-finding capacity
should not be required to make as particularized findings in order
to justify their adoption of remedial plans. The final part of this
section gives special attention to the example of congressional
competence in order to illustrate how these requirements can be
applied in the context of a particular government institution.
A.

The Authority Requirement

The first half of the competence inquiry-the institution's authority-asks whether the institution adopting the remedial plan
has been given the power to enunciate the government's interests
in preventing and eradicating racial discrimination. In one sense,
of course, authority is a prerequisite to all government actions, not
just those implicating equal protection concerns. A court's general
power to review the legality of another branch's action includes the
power to determine whether the action is authorized by the Constitution or statute.8 6 On this basis alone, with no help from the fourteenth amendment, a court could strike down the adoption of a
87
plan by a government body lacking the authority to do so.
Within the realm of competence, however, authority takes on
an additional role unique to equal protection analysis-authority is
an indicator of reliability. If an institution is authorized to advance
a particular government interest, it may be more reasonable to presume that the interest it offers to justify its actions actually motivated its adoption of the plan.8 8 Even more to the point, an express
86 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Katzenbach v. Mor-

gan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
1, See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (agency may impose nondiscrimination obligations on regulatees only insofar as the obligations further goals the agency is authorized
to pursue); Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1196-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (female preference in
station licensing held to be outside boundaries of commission's delegated authority). In the
same manner, findings of past discrimination by a government body not authorized to make
them cannot constitute a legitimate statement of government interest; the "government"
has not spoken through them at all.
"I See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (when "the agency which
promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting [a certain] interest,
it may reasonably be presumed that the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the

rule.").
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grant of authority indicates that those granting it-the authors of
the enabling provision-considered the authorized body to be able
to find and remedy discrimination in a reliable manner.
For some institutions, the extent of authority is immense. For
example, the authority of a federal court to assert government interests is extremely expansive: article III of the Constitution gives
courts broad power to find and remedy constitutional or statutory
violations in cases brought before them."9 Similarly, according to
most of the Justices, section 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to find and remedy constitutional violations. e0
Thus, both courts and Congress have a direct constitutional authorization to find violations of the antidiscrimination laws; this
authority legitimates their actions and adds credibility to their
conclusion that the government has an interest in correcting the
results of such violations.
For other government bodies, the nature of their authority
may be both less direct and less specific. If an institution has been
delegated explicit remedial power from another government body
that is itself constitutionally authorized to institute remedial
plans-such as Congress or the President-then the institution's
adoption of such a plan might be considered as reliable as an action by the delegating authority. If the terms of the delegation are
not explicit, however, or perhaps grant only a general administrative authority without specifically empowering the institution to
impose remedial plans, then lack of express or direct authority suggests that the institution's attempt to institute such a plan should
be more carefully scrutinized. In Bakke, for example, Justice Powell argued that the Board of Regents was not competent to assess
reliably the existence of past illegal discrimination because the
California legislature had not specifically delegated to it any such
power: "Its broad mission [was] education, not the formulation of
any legislative policy, or the adjudication of particular claims of
illegality."" 1
So Indeed, the same power inheres in all courts-state and federal-by the very nature
of the judicial obligation to hear and decide cases, coupled with the commands of the
supremacy clause, which binds all judges to enforce the Constitution and laws of the United
States as "the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
" See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (plurality opinion); id. at 508-10 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
92 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (Powell, J.). But see id. at 366 n.42 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(finding that the Regent's "plenary" authority over the university system was easily broad
enough to encompass the authority to remedy past discrimination by adopting race-conscious plans).
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The Findings Requirement

The second part of the inquiry into an institution's competence to adopt remedial affirmative action plans is the requirement
that the institution have made some findings of past violations of
the antidiscrimination laws.92 In a sense, this requirement is also a
prerequisite to any remedial government action. No public body is
authorized to institute explicit racial classifications without making at least some findings to justify the necessity or propriety of
those measures." If the plan is challenged, the courts must have
some basis for testing the strength of the claimed government interest in remedying past discrimination. Without any reviewable
findings that the plan serves that objective, the court can only reject the plan as indistinguishable from any other unjustified racial
9 4
classification.
The record that findings create for judicial review helps a
court test the reliability of an institution's asserted remedial motive in two ways. First, findings make it more likely that there has
been past discrimination. If the body's findings, as a factual matter, support the conclusion that discrimination occurred, a court
need inquire no further into the institution's remedial claims.
But even if findings provide less than conclusive proof of a
past violation, they still may be an important indicator of the institution's motive. If the body has gone through the process of uncovering and compiling facts about past discrimination, it is more
likely that remedial aims motivated its subsequent use of a raceconscious measure. The process of interpreting facts and weighing
evidence will often cause the institution to deliberate and discuss
whether discrimination has occurred, so a court can afford to be
less suspicious that the body's motive was impermissible. 5

"

See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48

(Powell, J.).
A paradigm of what is meant here by "findings" is some sort of reviewable record of
facts that support the conclusion that past violations of the antidiscrimination laws have
occurred, perhaps indicating both the parties responsible for the violations and those likely
to have been affected by them.
93 Even the federal courts, which are under an explicit duty to enforce the terms of the
Constitution, cannot impose race-conscious remedies unless they are responding to identified instances of past discrimination. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47
(1974).
'4 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
"5 The requirement of deliberation is often used in equal protection cases to help
smoke out subtle forms of discrimination. It originated in a proposal that rationality review
be made more stringent through the addition of an "articulated purposes" requirement.
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These explanations of why findings must be made also indicate when findings must be made. As Justice O'Connor pointed out
in Wygant, e6 an institution's remedial claim may be reliable even if
it did not make its findings at the time it adopted affirmative action; the existence of past discrimination-and thus a remedial interest-might be established conclusively in court when the plan is
challenged. But since the ultimate question is whether the institution's motive was remedial at the time it adopted the plan, contemporaneous findings are far more reliable than those made during later litigation. Hence, a court need not test the accuracy of
contemporaneous findings with the same vigor it would give to
non-contemporaneous findings.
C.

How Detailed Must Findings Be?

1. The Relation Between Institutional Structure and Findings. Although public institutions must make findings before
adopting remedial plans, not all institutions should be required to
compile a court-like record before doing so. A body's determinations may be particularly reliable if its fact-finding abilities complement or even improve on those of the courts. Where the nature
of the institution gives a court special reason to rely on its factfinding capacities, the court should accept less particularized findings as adequate to justify the adoption of a remedial plan.
Congress is a good example of a body with fact-finding capabilities that complement or improve on those available to the
courts. The institutional structure of Congress allows it to gather
and assess a broader spectrum of information than is available to
the courts. Unlike judges, legislators need not rely solely on the
parties close to a dispute to present the facts necessary to its resolution; Congress's information may come from a wide variety of
parties and observers.9 7 Such evidence can also be considered withThis would permit courts to uphold a classification only if the asserted purpose of the legislation was evidenced by the legislative history. See Gunther, supra note 9, at 21; cf. United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(adopting this approach).
When classifications potentially result from impermissible motivations, the deliberation
requirement may be used to determine whether permissible or impermissible motivations lie
behind the legislation. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976).
See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856-57 (O'Connor, J.).
See Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation on Separation of Powers, 18 J. Pun. L. 339, 350-51 (1969). Courts do have some tools to
enhance their information-gathering ability, however, such as expert witnesses and special
masters. See Wells & Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-Making:A Critique, 15 J.
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out the formal limits imposed by judicial rules of evidence or procedure. Congress can consider all evidence that may bear on the
issue at hand, including evidence that might confuse a jury or
prejudice a defendant.s
Congress also has special tools that allow it to consider and
interpret information perhaps more effectively than can a court.
To begin with, Congress has an advantage in manpower. For violations with complex histories, the collective understanding attainable by legislators and their staffs may far exceed that possible for a
single judge. Congress also aggregates experience in addressing a
particular problem over time, since its considerations extend beyond the bounds of a single case."9 Also, the committee system allows legislators to develop areas of expertise.1 00
These institutional advantages become even more valuable
when they are applied to the kind of facts necessary to establish a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The equal protection
clause reaches beyond purposeful discrimination by the state; it
also forbids state action which tends to perpetuate the effects of
past discrimination by private parties. 10 1 This principle was firmly

PuB. L. 286, 305-06 (1966).
" Of course, many evidentiary and procedural rules enhance the accuracy of adjudication, but these benefits are peculiar to the judicial process. The same rules would probably
be counterproductive if they were applied to legislative inquiries, which do not seek to
maintain impartiality in any strict sense but instead build on the representative nature of
the institution to gather a broad range of information. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
,1Justice Powell made this point in Fullilove, noting that Congress relies on "information and expertise that [it] acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members
gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings." 448 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
100 See DONALD HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 28-29 (1977).
101 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980) (noting that Congress may determine that certain voting rights provisions are "appropriate methods of attacking the perpetuation of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless of whether
the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only in effect."); Fiss, Gaston County v.
United States: Fruitionof the FreezingPrinciple,1969 Sup. CT. Rav. 379; cf. Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (enforcement clause of antislavery amendment empowered Congress to prohibit discrimination in real estate "whether or not sanctioned by
state law"). Indeed, this notion may be a logical result of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), where the Court's holding implied that Congress's power to enforce the civil war
amendments permits it to regulate actions which themselves do not violate the fifteenth
amendment. See Cox, Foreword:ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 102-03 (1966). The literacy requirements at issue in Morgan, although not themselves subject to equal protection challenge, could be regulated in order to
achieve equal protection in other areas, such as the provision of public services. This holding implies that even though private actions are not subject to direct attack, see Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), they may be within the scope of congressional regulation for
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established in the Supreme Court's treatment of voting rights legislation. 10 2 For a majority of the Court, Fullilove presented a similar application of that principle: the affirmative action plan they
approved was an effort to prevent the government's administration
of federal programs from continuing the effects of discriminatory
practices by private contractors. 10 3
It is easy to see how enforcement of the equal protection
clause to its fullest extent depends upon fact-finding techniques
and remedial flexibility not commonly seen in courts. For example,
even if the alleged discrimination is subject to challenge, a court
cannot remedy its lasting effects unless it finds a purposeful government action that perpetuates those effects. 10 4 Such a finding

other equal protection purposes.
202 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
103 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475-76 (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring). One could argue that this broader remedial tool might not be available to all governmental bodies. For example, although Justice Powell in Fullilove approved a Congressional plan aimed in part at the effects of private discrimination, his opinion in Wygant
implied that a school board has no power to remedy any constitutional violations besides
those it has committed itself. Justice Powell (and a majority of the Justices) rejected the
argument that a school board could use affirmative action to remedy "societal discrimination." Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 1857(opinion of White, J.). Powell seemed to define "societal discrimination" as any discrimination not practiced by the same public body which has
adopted the remedial plan. Id. at 4481 (Powell, J.) (in the past, the Court has allowed raceconscious remedies only for "prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved"); see
also id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J.) (" 'societal' discrimination ... is discrimination not traceable
to [the agency's] own actions").
This distinction is sensible, but it should be understood to be a consequence of the
differences in authority commonly seen among government bodies. See supra notes 86-91
and accompanying text (discussing the authority requirement). Congress, because of its generalized authority to remedy violations of the fourteenth amendment, and. state legislatures,
which possess broad police powers, may not be limited to remedying violations of their own
making. Local agencies, like school boards, typically possess a much narrower grant of
power. In the absence of express delegation, the only remedial authority such bodies may
exercise is the power to correct their own transgressions of the antidiscrimination laws. See
infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
This suggests that the dividing line between "societal discrimination" and institutionspecific discriminatory acts may not be as clear as the Wygant opinions imply. Other remedial discriminatory effects lie between those two extremes, including discrimination practiced by other branches or levels of government, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23
(Congress can enforce the fourteenth amendment against the states), and government acts
which tend to perpetuate the effects of private discrimination, see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
475-76 (plurality opinion) (fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to reach effects of
past private discrimination). These forms of discrimination are much more specific than
"societal discrimination," and they may be remedied by authorized government bodies that
are not in fact responsible for them.
1" See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971). Those effects, however, are the only facts that the
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may be unlikely, however, since the perpetuation may be subtle or
inadvertent. 105 Thus, if the courts alone were empowered to find
and remedy violations of the antidiscrimination laws, many of the
effects of discrimination would remain unreachable even though
they are remediable under the fourteenth amendment.
A legislative body like Congress, on the other hand, is in a
good position to spot government perpetuation of private discrimination. Indeed, Congress itself would be "responsible" for any perpetuation through federal programs. Congress may also have intimate knowledge of state activities that perpetuate discrimination,
given the information it derives from overseeing federal revenuesharing programs and commerce regulation. In contrast, a court
depends on the affected parties to bring government perpetuation
to light, despite the fact that private parties may not appreciate
the effects of the government's actions. In addition, although an
equal protection violation is established primarily on the basis of
motivations, 10 8 its perpetrators may be reluctant to admit their
true purposes.10 7 Under these circumstances, Congress's information-gathering capacity, which is both more dispersed and free of
procedural formalities, may be more effective than a court's
techniques.
Just as a legislature may have superior access to information
about the parties responsible for discriminatory effects, so too it
will often be in a better position to hear from the parties who may
be the most affected. A court might never hear from those injured
by discrimination or its continuing effects. The initial victims may
have lost their rights to seek a judicial remedy, and of course they
could never seek such redress at all if for some reason they could
not show a particularized injury. The people with the greatest incentives to seek redress-those who are presently affected-very
often were not the targets of the original discrimination. Although
these people stand to benefit the most from affirmative action,
they may not be in a position to receive judicial relief.
On the other hand, the representative nature of Congress is a
great aid in discerning the secondary effects of a violation. 08 The
affected parties are likely to be in a position to bring to a court's attention.
105 See Wright, supra note 84, at 223-24; Fiss, supra note 101, at 431-32 (discussing the
evidentiary difficulties that confront a court in trying to reconstruct the effects of past discrimination in voting, given a court's "authoritarian, nonrepresentative nature as an
institution").
'" See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
107 See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 100, at 48.
109

Although Congress's institutional structure suggests that it might be better than the
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prospect of re-election induces legislators to be sensitive to the
complaints of their constituents, including those who have been
hurt by the effects of past discrimination. 10 9 As noted above, legislators hear from a larger constituency than could ever be brought
to bear in a judicial action. In addition, the more relaxed procedures exercised in Congress allow it greater freedom to measure
intensities among this broader array of preferences. "1 0
These considerations suggest why the findings requirement
should be relaxed when it is applied to Congress, but they do not
define the kind of findings a court should require Congress to
make. Since Congress has particular advantages in finding past violations of the antidiscrimination laws-advantages that complement rather than simply reflect those possessed by courts-it
would be wrong to require it to compile a court-like record before
instituting a remedial plan. Instead, Congress need only make
some less particularized showing that it has found a past violation.
The record it compiles should contain some evidence that Congress
attended to this issue and found such a violation in order to justify
its adoption of race-conscious remedies.
The major challenge to this approach comes from Justice Stevens. Because he regards findings as a means to establish a public
institution's impartiality, he concludes that the findings requirement could not be relaxed at all for Congress: only a court-like
adjudication could impartially establish the existence of a violation."' This view should be rejected, as it was by the Court in Ful-

courts at remedying past societal discrimination, see Note, JudicialDeference, supra note
70, at 1245 n.76 (attributing the Court's deference in Fullilove to Congress's special ability
to see "societal discrimination"); see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 520 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring), a majority of the Supreme Court has foreclosed such a justification for affirmative
action. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 1857 (White, J.). That does not mean, however, that the fourteenth
amendment does not reach the effects of private discrimination which government action
may perpetuate. See supra note 103.
109 This is not to say that a legislature may always be relied upon to protect the interests of minorities. See JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST ch. 6 (1980) (discussing the
judicial role for protecting minority participation in the legislative process).
110 See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 100, at 44; Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously:
Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 366, 379-80
(1984).
"I See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Congress can make reme-

dial racial classifications only if it demonstrates it acted "impartially"); see also id. at 527
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (legislatures cannot make remedial racial classifications because
they lack the "dispassionate objectivity" and "flexibility" of a court); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at
1869-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (fairly negotiated and approved collective bargaining agree-

ment including affirmative action provision was procedurally sufficient to protect interests
of burdened class).
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liove.112 Obviously, impartiality is required in any proceeding that
may result in a sanction affecting the party guilty of the violation;
due process guarantees as much.1 13 But an affirmative action plan
aimed at remedying the effects of past discrimination is not such a
claim: it will be challenged not by the "guilty" parties-the alleged
perpetrators of the discrimination-but rather by the members of
a class who are burdened by the plan.
To understand why this burden imparts no special procedural
rights, it is helpful to separate two distinct aspects of the injury.
On the one hand, those burdened by an affirmative action plan are
denied a tangible benefit of some sort. Bakke, for example, was
denied admission to medical school. This burden, taken separately
from equal protection concerns, is no different from the costs that
may be imposed on citizens by any act of legislation. Yet legislatures need not compile a court-like record in order to impose such
burdens. The representative process is considered completely ade11 4
quate to protect against arbitrary decisions.

112

113
114

See supra note 15.
See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
This characteristic of congressional fact-finding has also supported deference to

Congress's findings in areas outside of equal protection. One such example is the theory of

legislative and adjudicative facts in administrative law. See 1 KENNETH DAvis,

ADMINSTRA-

TREATISE § 7.02 (1958). Under this theory, the degree of due process protection
given to individuals affected by administrative actions varies depending on whether the action contested is broad or narrow in its scope. As Justice Holmes stated in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), an action with broad effect-such as a general increase in tax rates-need not be accompanied by an opportunity
to be heard. Id. at 445. But due process may require such an opportunity where the action
concerns "[a] relatively small number of persons . . . who [are] exceptionally affected, in
each case upon individual grounds." Id. at 446 (distinguishing Londoner v. City of Denver,
210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908)). The former action resembles "legislation," the latter
"adjudication."
TrVE LAw

The two kinds of actions carry different procedural requirements because they seek to
uncover different kinds of information. Adjudication depends on facts about the particular
activities, business, and properties of the parties. Legislative facts are general facts which
bear on questions of policy. Due process imposes less need for hearing the particular parties
affected by legislative facts because those individuals are less likely to provide unique information important to an accurate decision. Indeed, for the purposes of due process, the findings of legislatures are assumed to be based upon "adequate knowledge after full consideration and through members who represent the entire public." Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290
U.S. 190, 197 (1933).
With regard to affirmative action, determinations about the effects of past discrimination depend more on legislative facts than on adjudicative facts. The class burdened by an
affirmative action plan offers no information relevant to the violation or its effects. And
since the burdens are distributed on a class-wide rather than an individual basis, the legislature would probably learn little from members of the burdened class.
This account undercuts Justice Stevens' view that those burdened by a remedial plan
are entitled to plenary court-like findings by a legislature. Since the parties eventually bur-
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The impetus for a searching inquiry into intent, and thus a
findings requirement, comes instead from the separate claim that
the affirmative action plan has violated the rights of the burdened
class to be free from impermissible racial classifications. The
strength of this claim is not necessarily related to the magnitude of
the burden imposed. Even a slight burden may violate the fourteenth amendment if imposed in a discriminatory fashion. 11 5 Regardless of its strength, the equal protection claim can be overcome
if the racial classification has a legitimate remedial purpose.
Thus the level of findings that courts should impose on Congress-and on any other public institution-depends on the reliability of that body's findings of past discrimination. The issue is
solely one of reliability in finding past violations: members of the
burdened class have no particular claim to impartiality as to this
aspect of the analysis, since they are not accused of any violation
themselves. Once findings have been made that are sufficient to
establish the existence of a past violation, any complaints about
the burden imposed by the plan are no different from a challenge
to any other legislative decision.
In addition to its theoretical soundness, this general approach
has precedential support. In other situations, the Supreme Court
has advocated deference to initial fact-finders that are especially
well positioned to find equal protection violations. This is true of
course for any district court's finding that the antidiscrimination
laws have been violated."16 Likewise, courts have been extremely
deferential to school boards which have found that they themselves discriminated in the past.117 Just as the findings of fact in
these situations are made more reliable by their special access or
proximity to the violation, so the findings of Congress are more
reliable because of its special ability to take into account the concerns of parties affected by affirmative action.

dened by an affirmative action plan seldom have anything to add, to the facts available to
the legislature-since they have no special knowledge of particular~'acts relevant to the existence of a violation-there is little justification for requiring Congress to take special precautions or create a court-like record to address their potential complaints. Instead, the
issue of the distribution of burdens imposed by such a plan is simply one of legislative facts.
1 See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) ("Invidious discrimination does not become less so because the discrimination accomplished is of a lesser magnitude."). The extent of due process protection, on the other hand, may well vary with the
gravity of the potential injury. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
116Even where such findings lead to the use of racial classifications, a district court's
findings of fact about discrimination are subject to reversal only if they are clearly erroneous. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
117 See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
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2. The Relationship Between Authority and Findings. A
body's institutional character is not the only measure of reliability
affecting the level of findings that should be required. The nature
and scope of an institution's authority may also provide a reason to
defer to the assertion that a remedial purpose motivates its adoption of a race-conscious plan. This suggests that where the grant of
authority to a government body is direct or explicit, a court can
relax the findings requirement accordingly." 8 Yet this relation can
never go so far as to permit an institution to dispense with the
findings requirement altogether. Even an institution that held a
very strong or "absolute" grant of power to take such measures
might do so without adequate justification-hence the need for at
least some findings in every case. 119
This relation between authority and findings finds considerable support in the congressional example. In Fullilove, the Court
noted Congress's broad authority to find and remedy violations of
the antidiscrimination laws under both the commerce clause and
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 0 And the
Court required little in the way of congressional findings, suggesting that if the Constitution directly empowers Congress to
identify and correct such violations, it allows Congress to exercise
that power through the same procedures that Congress uses for
any other decision. As Justice Powell wrote, "Congress is not an
adjudicatory body . . . . [It] is not expected to act as though it
were duty bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The
creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply
does not entail the same concept of recordkeeping that is appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. 1 2 1 Chief Justice

n1 Justice Powell suggested this conclusion in his concurrence in Fullilove: "The degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of discretion in
the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of a government body." 448
U.S. at 515 n.14; see also Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 170-71 (6th Cir.
1983); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173, 177-78 (E.D. Mich.
1983).
' See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing the need for some
"reason to believe" the race-conscious action serves a remedial purpose).
110 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 499-500 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
2
Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was emphatic on this point; a rigorously enforced findings requirement, he said, "would mark an unprecedented imposition
of adjudicatory procedures on a coordinate branch of Government." Id. at 503. In part, this
approach reflects a view of Congress's capacity to compile court-like findings. A legislature
may not be able to make detailed findings because much of the knowledge on which its
members rely never appears in committee reports, hearings, or debates. Much information
comes instead from the daily exposures uniquely available to a "people's representative."
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Burger's plurality opinion also stated that the Court owed special
deference to the conclusions of Congress based on Congress's elevated station in the constitutional scheme.1 22
Deference to congressional findings on the basis 6f Congress's
special authority is particularly consistent with the Court's broader
understanding of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 23 the Court held that section 5 gives Congress
a measure of authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment that
is comparable to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
under the necessary and proper clause. Within the sphere of commerce regulation, the Court permits Congress to take any reasonable means to implement its desired ends, so long as the ends are
permissible. 124 Morgan itself applied commerce-like deference to a
statute aimed at enforcing the equal protection of the laws by altering a state's voting procedures. Since a remedial affirmative action plan also falls within the legitimate objectives of section 5,
Morgan's deference to Congress's choice of means to implement1 25a
remedy might also justify relaxation of the findings requirement.
Indeed, much of the reasoning in Morgan directly supports
deference to congressional findings. Although the Court found it
necessary to decide whether the end sought to be achieved by the
legislation-greater equality in the provision of public services-was within the legitimate goals of equal protection,1 2 6 the
Court deferred to Congress's finding that the end itself was
real-that there might have been discrimination in public services.1 27 And without stringent review, the Court also allowed Congress to balance the competing constitutional interests implicated

See Cox, supra note 101, at 105.
122 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473, 480.
12 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
124 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
125 The Court's holding in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which refused to
Alefer to Congress's choice of means in altering state voting age requirements, might seem to
contradict this understanding. But Mitchell did not undermine Morgan with regard to congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendments prohibitions against racialdiscrimination. Justice Black's decisive concurrence in Mitchell distinguished Morgan on that very
basis. See id. at 129.
226 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649-50.
127 See id. at 652 (hypothesizing several findings of fact Congress might have made, any
of which would have sufficed). Morgan's deference to congressional fact-finding about the
existence of a permissible objective is underscored by the explicit disagreement between
majority and dissent on the adequacy of the legislative record supporting the challenged
law. Compare id. at 653-58 (citing congressional debates) with id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dis-

senting) ("[tihere is simply no legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination" in public services).
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by the legislation. Extensive findings were not required to prove
that Congress's constitutionally recognized enforcement interest
outweighed the constitutionally reserved powers of the states to
regulate voting. 12 8
This complementary relationship between authority and the
levels of findings required also builds on familiar principles of judicial power. The findings requirement facilitates judicial review of
the factual inferences that underlie a government body's decision;
lower courts and administrative agencies compile extensive records
for this reason. 129 But when a public institution is expressly
granted authority to identify or define government interests, a
court has proportionally lesss power of review or justification for
3
requiring extensive findings.
An explicit grant of implementation power, such as the necessary and proper clause or section 5, is just such a special grant of
authority; it inevitably gives Congress much room for discretion. 3 1
With regard to implementing legislation, this discretion weakens
the traditional presumption that only the judiciary may interpret
the Constitution conclusively. If Congress can interpret the fourteenth amendment, it has some power to define which conduct violates the amendment.132 And if it can define violations, surely it
228 See id. at 653 (Congress is allowed to "assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations"); Cox, supra note 101, at 104.
2, See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1257-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (statutory
provision giving courts power to review agency decision for "substantial evidence" implies
that agency must compile record to facilitate review).
11' Deference to another institution's ability to identify interests is nothing new in the
area of equal protection. The Court's first case applying strict scrutiny, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), accepted the military's conclusion that internment of
the Japanese was necessary to the war effort, and thus supplied a compelling government
interest. Id. at 219-20. The decision may be understood as expressing the Court's doubts
about its own competence to test the military's findings. See Komesar, supra note 110, at
390-91; see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (court must accept Congress's judgment that military needs justify registering only men for potential conscription).
131 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51.
12 See id. at 648-49 (holding that Congress may prohibit action under the fourteenth
amendment without a judicial finding that the action is unconstitutional).
Not only were the theoretical bases for deference in Morganand Fullilove nearly identical, but the cases confronted congressional findings of the same character. To justify the
remedial plan in Fullilove, Congress needed to confirm the existence of past discrimination
and its harmful effects. This finding paralleled Congress's conclusion in Morgan that voting
standards resulted in unequal public services. See 384 U.S. at 652. Once a violation was
established in Fullilove, Congress had to balance the magnitude of this interest against the
rights of the burdened class to be free from racial classifications. Likewise, the Morgan
Court deferred to Congress's balance of state and individual interests. See id. at 653. These
similarities also reconcile the Court's deference in Morgan with that of the Fullilove
plurality.
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can identify them when they occur.
The difficulty with an approach that aligns the rigor of the
findings requirement with the strength of the authorization lies in
constructing the balance between the authorization and the need
for findings. In some instances, the strength of the authorization
may be unclear.' Also, the congressional example offers little obvious guidance about the competence of other government bodies,
whose authority typically rests on a weaker foundation, such as a
mere statutory grant of authority without particular terms from
another government body.
III.

APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPETENCE TO PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS

The previous section's analysis shows that "competence" is a
complex blend of factors that run much deeper than the labels
"authority" and "findings" first suggest. Yet certain basic principles of competence have been identified. Authority is a critical feature not only as a primary indicator of an institution's reliability,
but also because it may constrain the scope of judicial scrutiny of
an institution's actions. In addition, the strength of authority affects the scope of the necessary findings. The level of findings required also depends on the practical aspects of an institution's
structure and procedures that make its determinations more or less
reliable. Thus the deference accorded to an institution's findings
depends also on how much need exists for close judicial oversight
of its particular decisionmaking process.
Although this basic framework provides a fuller explanation of
"competence" than is given in the cases, it remains vague until it is
applied to the various government institutions that may promulgate remedial affirmative action plans. This section applies these
principles to state and local legislative bodies and to agencies in
order to get an idea of which public institutions are competent to
133See Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review & Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
809, 816, 823 (1983) (discussing the difficulties of determining an agency's mission). This
may be a problem even where the grant of authority is explicit and very powerful, if the
grant is at all ambiguous. For example, even section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, by its
terms, is susceptible to more than one interpretation. It could mean that Congress has the
authority to find and remedy violations of the antidiscrimination laws; hence federal courts
would owe deference to Congress's conclusion that a violation exists. Or it could be taken to
mean that Congress has only the power to impose a remedy for what has already been properly identified as as violation of the law, leaving a court to review only the method by which
Congress discerns the violation in the first place.
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adopt remedial plans.1 3 4
A.

State and Local Legislatures

1. State Legislatures. The Supreme Court has never tested
the competence of state legislatures to adopt race-conscious remedial plans. Lower courts have done so using an analysis nearly
identical to the Court's approach in Fullilove. And their analysis
has led to the same kind of deference for the findings of state legislatures which the Supreme Court gave to the national legislature. 13 5 According to the principles developed in this comment, this
is the correct approach.
Congress's strong authority to find past violations of the antidiscrimination laws flows primarily from its power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment. State legislatures hold their authority as
part of a much more general entitlement: the police power inherent
in every state government to "protect the health, safety and morals
of the community." 13 6 In these areas, the state's power extends to
all powers not explicitly reserved to the federal government or
withheld from the states.13 7 Arguably, then, the police power might
permit a state legislature to enunciate state interests in identifying
and remedying illegal discrimination and its effects.
On the other hand, one could argue that the power to tackle
discrimination falls outside the realm of a state's police power. If
Congress needed the strong language of section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to obtain the authority to implement remedial
plans,' 8 why should a state's vague police power be thought to include such power without an explicit enforcement provision like
section 5?'s9
'3"As noted previously, if the competence of a public institution is established, that
merely affirms the government's legitimate interest in adopting the remedial plan. It does
not establish the ultimate validity of the plan; the plan must also be narrowly tailored to
remedy the past discrimination that was identified. This remaining issue of the "means-end
fit" is discussed briefly infra note 174.
131 See, e.g., Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983); Michigan
Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
106 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964); see also ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 3 (1904) (the police power "aims directly to secure and promote
the public welfare"); 6 EUGENE McQUULIN, MUNICnAL CORPORIONS § 24.07 (3d ed. rev.
1980) ("the police power belongs exclusively to sovereignty and inheres in the state").
'37See E.FREUND, supra note 136, §§ 62-63.
138 See supra notes 90, 120.
139 See Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629, 634 (M.D. Ala. 1980)
(only Congress may enact an affirmative action plan, though it may delegate that power if it
explicitly "command[s] such disparate treatment"); Choper, The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 Ky. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1981-82) (outlining
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The answer to this argument lies in careful analysis of the nature of a state's police power. Most important, a state's power to
enact legislation relating to the health and morals of its citizens
clearly encompasses the subject of racial discrimination, a critical
issue in modern American society. Yet, in the absence of section 5,
the enumerated federal powers might reach it only indirectly, perhaps through congressional control of interstate commerce. 140 This
would- explain why an affirmative grant of power might be necessary for federal action, but not for state action. 141 And in any
event, the Supreme Court has recognized state power to enforce
the equal protection clause, albeit outside the sphere of affirmative
action, by ruling that "there is no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race . . . is within the police
'142
power of the states.
On this basis, some courts have considered the police power a
source of authority sufficient to eliminate the need for a state legislature to make particularized findings of past violations.1 43 In part,
this deference expresses a belief that state legislatures would be
unable to compile meaningful findings. Like Congress, their decisionmaking depends on methods of information-gathering that do
not lend themselves to the compilation of written records. 4 In
light of the state's extensive police power, and since more stringent
review might create practical problems, courts have found state
legislatures competent to identify violations without requiring particularized findings.
For the courts to require no findings, however, would provide
inadequate assurance that the remedial motive asserted by the legislative was in fact legitimate. Nonetheless, the principles of competence indicate that the findings requirement can be relaxed substantially for state legislatures. State legislatures share many of the

the argument). In fact, the argument for exclusive congressional power is strengthened by
comparing the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, which provides only for
congressional enforcement, to the enforcement clause of the eighteenth amendment, which
explicitly delegated such power to the states and Congress concurrently. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIlI, § 2 (repealed 1933).
140 Congress's commerce power may have provided an additional foundation for the
preference plan approved in Fullilove. See supra note 120.
141 See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983) (outlining but
rejecting the argument that only Congress may enact affirmative action plans).
142 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953).
143 See, e.g., Keip, 713 F.2d at 171-72.
144 In addition, written records are often not kept in state proceedings. See, e.g., May v.
Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983) (no records for New Jersey legislature),
aff'd, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
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violation-finding capabilities possessed by Congress. " The representative nature of the relationship between legislators and constituents facilitates communication of information about a broader
class of perpetrators and victims of discrimination than might have
access to the courts. State legislatures can find facts informally and
aggregate information over long periods to develop a sophisticated
understanding of discriminatory motivations. Indeed, these capabilities might even be enhanced at the state level, where closer
proximity to problems allows a sharper focus. Thus, courts should
require only minimal findings as a prerequisite to the adoption of
remedial plans by state legislatures. Courts should have some proof
that the adopted plan was intended to serve a remedial interest,
and that the legislature engaged in some discussion about the past
violations, either at the time of adoption or at some point in the
14
recent past.
2. Local Representative Bodies. The Supreme Court also has
not spoken directly about the competence of local bodies with
elected officials, such as county legislatures and city councils. The
lower courts have usually considered such bodies to be analogous
to state legislatures. 4 Yet the two kinds of institutions differ in
two important respects.

"I See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (describing Congress's fact-finding
characteristics).
146Keip is an excellent example of the approach suggested here. In that case, a remedial plan was upheld even though the state legislature made no specific findings of past
discrimination. See 713 F.2d at 169-71. The court rested its conclusion primarily on prior
studies made by committees of the legislature as evidence of the discrimination problem
that the legislature sought to address. See id. at 171.
Given that some state legislatures keep few or no records of their proceedings, however,
even the minimal findings requirement suggested by Justice Powell in Fullilove might call
for modified procedures during the consideration of affirmative action legislation. For example, witnesses might help to to reconstruct the legislative process by recounting the findings
of discrimination underlying the legislature's adoption of a preference. This technique has
been used in other contexts to determine statutory purpose. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman,
572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983), af'd, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
" On county legislatures, see South Fla. Chapter of the Ass'd Gen. Contractors of Am.
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220
(1984); Southwest Wash. Chapter of the Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100
Wash. 2d 109, 122, 667 P.2d 1092, 1099 (1983) (en banc). On city councils, see Local 35,
IBEW v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981);
Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323, (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 572 F.2d
1258 (8th Cir. 1978); Hutchinson Human Relations Comm'n v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,
213 Kan. 308, 578 P.2d 158 (1973) (city and its human relations commission both found
competent); Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 548 P.2d 320 (Wash. 1976). But see Arrington v.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1981). See generally Note, Race as
Employment Qualification to Meet Police OperationalNeeds, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413, 427
(1979) (discussing city council competence in a nonremedial context).
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First, the authority of local bodies may be less direct or narrower in scope than that of the state legislatures. Local legislatures, such as city councils, operate on the basis of police power
delegated from the state. This delegation may be accomplished
through a home rule provision in the local body's charter or other
organic legislation. 48 State law generally governs on whether home
rule provisions should be construed narrowly or broadly.'49 If the
power to address racial discrimination is not explicitly reserved to
the local body, these rules of state law will determine whether this
power is included in the more general grant.
Second, although local elective bodies .often possess the considerable advantages in information-gathering that derive from
their representativeness and institutional structure, their fact-finding capabilities may be inferior to those of state legislatures. Local
bodies often represent a smaller and less diverse constituency.
They may operate according to less formal procedures, and may in
particular lack the more elaborate internal checks and delays that
foster expertise and necessitate a more extensive focus on
problems in larger legislative bodies. 150 And although local bodies
are even closer to the problems they address than are the state
legislatures, their proximity may make them more prone to respond to majority pressures, which could interfere with their ability to gather and assess information.' 5'
Therefore, although local representative bodies may to some
extent share the state legislature's police power authority and its
superior fact-finding capabilities, a more stringent findings requirement is appropriate for many local bodies. A court might require, for example, more specific identification of those who discriminated and those who were discriminated against before it will
approve the adoption of a remedial plan.
See OSBORNE REYNOLDS, LOcAL. GOVERNMENT LAW § 49 (1982).
See id. at §§ 50-52; see also Southwest Wash. Chapter of the Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 123, 667 P.2d 1092, 1100 (1983) (en banc).
1' Examples of these internal checks in many larger legislative bodies are bicameralism, committee systems, and requirements for multiple readings of proposed legislation in
each chamber that considers it.
151 See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (A. Hamilton) (suggesting that factions may more easily
dominate smaller, local legislative bodies); id. No. 10 (J. Madison) (same). One example of
this problem in the equal protection context is the issue of affirmative action undertaken by
a "black majority." Because a race-conscious plan adopted by a minority-dominated local
legislature may not have received the same level of self-interested scrutiny given a similar
plan adopted by a white majority, there may be some reason for a court to examine more
closely the asserted remedial interest behind the plan. However, as the existence of a black
majority is still relatively unusual in this country, the potential problem would not call for
across-the-board heightened scrutiny of remedial interests asserted by local legislatures.
148
1'9
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Administrative Agencies

Courts have rightly examined the actions of agencies more intensely than those of representative bodies, looking closely at
agency authority as well as agency findings. To understand the
case law and its congruence with the approach to competence proposed here, it is helpful to separate three different ways in which
administrative agencies are involved in affirmative action. They
can implement a plan developed in detail by Congress or a state
legislature; they can develop and implement their own plan with
explicit legislative authorization; or they can develop and implement their own plan in the absence of explicit authorization.
Courts rarely question the competence of agencies acting
merely to implement plans developed by the legislature. 152 At issue
in such plans is Congress's competence, not that of the agency;
Congress effectively defined the government's interests when it authorized those specific measures. At the federal level, this has led
courts to approve hiring preferences in consent decrees negotiated
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title
VII, 15 and to allow the Attorney General to invalidate state literacy tests pursuant to specific provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.154 For both of these administrative actions, Congress had issued specific guidelines for the agency's implementation. 155
When agencies both develop and implement a plan with explicit authorization, however, courts have examined their competence more carefully. 56 On the first consideration-whether the
"'
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n.41 (Powell, J., concurring) (congressionally authorized
administrative actions are beyond challenge where there has been "detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations").
'53 See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1978); EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 457 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
'" See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
'65 For example, the legislative history of Title VII included detailed reports of the

severity of discrimination in the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
26 (1963). Congress also gave the agencies the criteria for enforcement. The Voting Rights
Act only became applicable to a particular state if the Director of the Census found that less
than 50% of the residents had voted and the Attorney General found that a "test or device"
abridged the right to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)-(b) (1982).
1' The best example of this kind of agency action concerned the implementation of
Executive Order 11,246. The executive order explicitly delegated the President's procurement power to the Labor Department for the purpose of "implement[ing] affirmative action" in government contracting. Nearly all the courts that have heard challenges to the
Labor Department's implementation have approved it. See Larsen, Race Consciousness in
Employment after Bakke, 14 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 215, 237 n.110 (1979) (listing cases).
Only a few of these cases addressed the issue of the Department's competence to institute
the plan. See, e.g., Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18 (7th Cir.
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authority delegated to the agency includes the power to adopt race
conscious remedial plans-courts have been very permissive. They
have practically assumed such authority to be established, and
have often found it strong enough to lessen the need for agency
findings. 57 The application of competence principles suggests that
this approach is too lenient.
First, the scope of the agency's delegated authority should be
examined closely in order to discern whether the delegating body
itself has the authority to adopt remedial plans, and whether that
authority was expressly or implicitly included in the delegation.
Courts should also look closely at the agency's exercise of the
power it has received, to ensure158that it fulfilled any conditions imposed by the-delegating body.
Once the agency's authority to adopt remedial plans is established, the question becomes one of what level of findings they
must make in support of the claim of past violations of the antidiscrimination laws. Here it is helpful to compare the nature of an
agency's delegated power with Congress's direct power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Both sources of power indicate reliability to some extent-the legislature seems to trust the
agency just as the drafters of section 5 trusted Congress. But unlike direct section 5 authority, delegated power implies no limitation on a court's reviewing power which would counsel against the
strict imposition of a findings requirement. 15 There is less reason
to defer to the agency because, unlike Congress, the agency does
not have direct or coequal authority to define constitutional violations. This difference between congressional and direct legislative
authority suggests that more particularized findings should be re1975); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1

See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 n.8 (5th

Cir. 1977) ("only a loose relationship between the noneconomic objective, i.e., regulating
employment discrimination, and the procurement function" of the agency need exist).
1" See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. Of course, as the discussion revealed
earlier, this basic inquiry into authority is not unique to equal protection analysis.
i" See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's authority to
define violations of the equal protection clause and how this power affects judicial review).
Indeed, the delegation of power to agencies is sometimes thought to be justifiable because
judicial review is available to contain it. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court
invalidated unicameral legislative oversight of agency action, noting that it amounted to
"lawmaking" without compliance with normal lawmaking procedures. The Court distinguished agency action, saying it was not "lawmaking," precisely because such action is "always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it," and thus is subject
to judicial review. Id. at 953 n.16. The same might also be said in the state context, where
courts would have less reason to defer to a state agency than to the legislature, which wields
direct authority under the state's police powers.
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quired before agencies can adopt remedial plans.
This conclusion is also supported by the institutional structure
of most administrative agencies. In particular, most agencies lack
one aspect that is critical to Congress's reliability: representativeness. Because of this there is less assurance that an agency's claim
of a prior violation is informed by broader contacts with the perpetrators or those they have affected.16e At the same time, however,
agencies do obey a set of procedural rules that are designed to enhance impartiality, and thus may indicate reliability.1"' In some instances, these rules graft court-like procedures onto agency action,
and thus might impart to agencies some features of the competence found in federal courts. 62 But impartiality is only one indicator of reliability. It says nothing about the sufficiency of the information which underlies the agency's declaration.6 3 A
requirement of more particularized findings, on the other hand,
would address that aspect of reliability directly.
In light of this analysis of agency authority and institutional
structure, it would be appropriate for a court to rule that an
agency may be given discretionary power to specify and remedy
past violations of the antidiscrimination laws only if it does so in a
manner that permits meaningful judicial review-in other words,
only if it compiles more particularized findings. Such findings
could include specific identification of those who discriminated or
were discriminated against, and might include detailed statistical
16o Whereas courts need not review the distribution of burdens by a competently
adopted legislative plan when testing the government's interest, see supra text accompanying notes 114-15, they should review this aspect of a plan developed through agency action
that is less representative. This approach may explain the difference between Justice Powell's deferential treatment of a congressional plan in Fullilove, see supra text accompanying
notes 47-48, and his rigorous attention to the distribution of burdens in a school board's
plan in Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1849-52.
161 Federal agency action is regulated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-7521 (1982). States often have open hearing laws to the same effect. See 1 K.
DAvis, supra note 114, § 6:04.
20 This is largely the effect of the APA's formal rulemaking procedures. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 557 (1982) (setting forth formal rulemaking procedures). When an agency's affirmative
action plan produces a court-like record, a court probably need not even confront the findings issue-the record provides sufficient findings in any event.
16' See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the role of impartiality
in assessing competence). Of course, if the institution were representative, as may be the
case with school boards, then this is an additional reason for relaxing the findings requirement. Similarly, some police boards have a degree of representative accountability through
mayoral supervision. Although it is unclear whether this fact should carry any weight, some
courts have thought it important in establishing competence. See Baker, 483 F. Supp. at
993.
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information. 164
Finally, if an agency attempts to develop and implement a remedial plan without an explicit legislative directive, the range of
competent agency action is very limited. Thus, the position suggested in some lower courts that a nonrepresentative body may
adopt a remedial plan if it has public visibility and an expertise in
administering a particular field,16 5 must be rejected as too broad.
Neither the unpredictable public exposure of a government body
nor its general experience in an area can authorize it to act where
no specific grant of authority can be found.16 6 In short, at some
point a lack of specific authority indicates lack 67of any authority,
1
regardless of the particularity of findings made.
Nevertheless, lower courts have widely approved one exception
to this last category of administrative action: remedial plans
adopted by state police and school boards without legislative authorization, where the plans are intended to alleviate the effects of
their own past discrimination.16 8 The adoption of these plans was

See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 n.17,
339 n.20 (1977) (detailing city-specific racial disparities in the freight-driving trade); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing executive finding of disparaties among tradesmen in contracting). This is in contrast to the more relaxed
findings that should be required of state legislatures, see supra note 146 and accompanying
text, and of local representative bodies, see supra text following note 151.
l See the cases discussed supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
188 For Justice Powell, Bakke was just such a case; the Regents failed to show even a
minimal level of specific authorization to adopt a remedial affirmative action plan. See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (Powell, J.).
180 See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (agency may impose nondiscrimination
obligations on regulatees only insofar as the obligations furthered the intended purposes of
the agency); Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (female preference in station
licensing was outside the boundaries of the commission's delegated authority). One could
argue, however, that these cases simply stand for the proposition that agency action may not
exceed its statutory authority. If the challenged plans had been more closely tied to the
agencies' purposes, they might not have been so easily invalidated. Rather, under the competence principles suggested here, a court could have upheld such plans if quite detailed
and comprehensive findings had been made. This result would extend Justice Powell's notion of competence, as it would suggest that the Regents in Bakke could have adopted a
remedial plan if they had made sufficient findings. Powell rejected this argument. Bakke,
458 U.S. at 309.
18 The primary cases in this area involved an affirmative action plan promulgated by
the Detroit Police Board. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
affd sub. nom. Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); see also Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d
671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers'
Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984). Several other cases presented the same issues.
E.g., Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981); Van Aken v. Young, 541 F.
Supp. 448 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
The Detroit plan had both remedial and nonremedial justifications. Hiring ratios for
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further strengthened by extensive findings.16 9 But if findings can
make such unauthorized bodies competent, it might seem that any
state body could implement an affirmative action plan in order to
remedy the effects of its own violations of the antidiscrimination
laws.
The principles of competence developed here support this conclusion. On the authority side, the power of an agency to attack its
own violations does not lack for explicit grounding. Although there
may be no special grant of authority from some other institution,
the authority of any government body to remedy the effects of its
own violations comes from the fourteenth amendment itself. The
170
Supreme Court established this point in McDaniel v. Baressi,
where it approved a busing program adopted voluntarily by a
school board. In justifying the board's action, the Court stated that
the school board had an "affirmative duty" to undo the effects of
any violation it had committed in the past. 7 1 Thus, a court's authority was not needed for an agency's remedial affirmative action
plan; by compelling such action, the fourteenth amendment neces72
sarily authorized it.1
This does not mean, however, that an agency is free to use
racial preferences to correct its own violations without making any
findings. For an agency using its McDaniel power, the existence of
a past violation is itself a prerequisite of the agency's remedial authority. Hence, although a self-incriminating admission will often
be reliable,17 3 a requirement of particularized findings will help the

blacks were intended both to compensate for a history of discrimination within the police
force and to reduce tensions between the police and black citizens. See Baker, 483 F. Supp.
at 980, 995. Although the nonremedial aspect does not bear on this comment, see supra note
2, it may well have been an important part of the courts' approval of the Detroit plan.
131See Young, 608 F.2d at 694; Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 993.
170 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
7 Id. at 41. For this proposition the Court cited Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968), a case in which the Court conferred broad authority on federal courts to
implement remedial busing programs. Apparently, McDaniel stands for the proposition that
this authority inheres in any school district guilty of past discrimination, and a school board
need not wait for a court decree in order to exercise its authority.
17 This authority, however, carries an important caveat. The authority given to a government body under McDaniel is limited to remedies for the effects of discrimination by
that body. Without some other source of authority, a body cannot order remedies for the
violations of private individuals or other government bodies. Courts should enforce this limitation when they examine the "means-end fit" as the last step in their scrutiny of such
plans. For a brief discussion of this problem, see infra note 174.
173 As Justice O'Connor pointed out in Wygant, such admissions may increase the institution's exposure to civil rights liability, and reduce voluntary compliance with the antidiscrimination laws. See Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1855-56 (O'Connor, J.). But see id. at 1849
n.5 (Powell, J.) (school board's post hoc concession of past discriminatory practices is not
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court to conclusively establish the actor's remedial authority.
CONCLUSION

The affirmative action controversy raises a difficult issue: when
the need to remedy racial discrimination justifies the use of racial
preferences. Yet the traditional approach to racial classifications
often seems unable to capture the purposes likely to motivate the
use of affirmative action. This comment has argued that when the
avowed purpose of a race-conscious plan is the remedying of past
violations of the antidiscrimination laws, the best way to ensure
that the remedial motives behind the plan are legitimate is to concentrate on the character of the institution implementing it. The
central question is whether the institution is competent to adopt
such a plan. Competence, in turn, is indicated by two factors that
show the reliability of an institution's allegation that past violations have occurred: authority and findings. When both of these
factors are present, a court can rely on the institution's claim of
past violations as making out a sufficiently compelling interest for
17 4
the use of explicit racial classifications.
reliable). As she notes, these considerations may justify dispensing with a contemporaneous
findings requirement and allowing the existence of a past violation to be an issue litigated if
and when the racial preference is challenged. See id. at 1856-57 (O'Connor, J.); see also
supra text accompanying note 96.
174 The principles of institutional competence developed in this comment have implications not only for discerning the legitimacy of the government's interest in a remedial affirmative action plan, but also for the exactness with which a plan must meet that objective.
Although a majority of the Justices now apparently require "narrow tailoring" in an affirmative action program, see Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 1857 (White, J., concurring), the Court's precedents
seem to delineate different levels of means-end scrutiny for different government bodies: the
congressional plan at issue in Fullilove was held to a much looser fit requirement than the
school board plan tested in Wygant.
Competence principles help explain this difference in two ways. First, the appropriate
level of scrutiny will depend in large part on the extent of a body's authority. As a matter of
judicial power, the deference accorded to bodies with extremely strong sources of authority,
see supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text, extends not only to the need for findings,
but also to the closeness with which the plan is tailored. In addition, if the body has authority to attack less particularized forms of discrimination, such as the effects of past private
discrimination, see supra note 103 and accompanying text, means-end scrutiny necessarily
becomes more circumspect. More general discrimination is necessarily remedied in more
general ways.
Second, competent bodies may also deserve less searching means-end review because
such bodies are unlikely to be motivated by illegitimate ends. Like the inquiry into the
importance of the government's interest, means-end scrutiny is primarily a way of discerning whether a racial preference is impermissibly motivated. When an institution is judged
competent to implement a race-conscious remedial plan, the court has already done much
more than rely on the institution's bare articulation of a compelling government interest in
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This approach makes it possible to generalize about the competence of different government bodies and the extent of findings
they must make to legitimate their adoption of a remedial plan.
State legislatures, like Congress, have characteristics which indicate a high degree of reliability in finding past violations; the
courts should not require particularized findings before judging
them competent to adopt such plans. Local representative bodies
share some of these characteristics, though to a lesser extent, and
should therefore be required to make somewhat more particularized findings. Nonelected government administrative agencies may
also be competent, but in most situations only after compiling
much more specific findings.
Mark S. Kende

remedying past discrimination-the institution has been judged competent because it actually has made reliable findings of past discrimination. This inquiry goes much further to
uncover impermissible motives than does the court's normal inquiry into the presence (i.e.,
bare articulation) of a compelling government interest. Hence, a court need not look as
closely at the means-end fit in order to validate a competently adopted remedial plan.

